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Here's Your Burrito and Watch Your Back:
Does Missouri Really Want to Hold
Businesses Liable for Attacks on Patrons?
Stroot v. Taco Bell Corp.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In the late 1980s, Missouri altered a longstanding common law rule and
found that businesses sometimes owe a duty to their patrons to protect against
or warn about criminal attacks by third parties.' This new rule generally applies
when a business has experienced prior incidents that are reasonably recent and
similar to the attack in question.3
In Stroot v. Taco Bell Corp., the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern
District of Missouri upheld a summary judgment entered in favor of a business
for an attack that occurred in the business's parking lot even though the victim
alleged that prior violent incidents had occurred in the parking lot and filed
supporting affidavits.4 Perhaps Stroot represents a shift away from the modem
trend of premises liability law and a return to a "take care of yourself' approach.
Even more surprising is the court's apparent willingness to ignore the rescue
doctrine in favor of protecting businesses from potential liability.
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Timothy Stroot was waiting in line to place his order at Taco Bell when he
heard that a woman was being attacked in the parking lot.5 After informing Taco
Bell employees and asking them to call the police, Stroot went to the parking lot
to confront the attacker.6 Stroot spoke briefly to the attacker before a third party,
Ryan Parker, attacked and severely beat Stroot.7 No Taco Bell employees
attempted to assist Stroot.
8
Stroot brought a negligence action against Taco Bell in the City of St. Louis
Circuit Court.9 He alleged that Taco Bell was negligent in that Taco Bell failed
to: (1) provide adequate security and lighting in the parking lot area; (2) take
1. 972 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
2. See Madden v. C & K Barbecue Carryout, Inc., 758 S.W.2d 59, 62 (Mo. 1988).
3. See Keesee v. Freeman, 772 S.W.2d 663, 669 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
4. Stroot, 972 S.W.2d at 448.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. Stroot suffered extensive injuries as a result of the beating and spent two
weeks in a coma.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 447.
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adequate precautions to make the premises safe; and (3) warn Stroot about
danger on its premises."0 Stroot argued that Taco Bell had a duty to protect him
from foreseeable criminal danger because of his status as a business invitee,"
and that Taco Bell's employees' failure to call for police assistance or intervene
created a situation where Stroot felt compelled to assist the woman in distress.'2
Taco Bell moved for summary judgment, arguing that: (1) Stroot failed to
prove specific incidents of prior violent crimes on Taco Bell premises; that (2)
Taco Bell owes no duty to customers who willingly intervene in fights on Taco
Bell premises; and that (3) even if Taco Bell owed a duty to Stroot, Taco Bell's
negligence was not the proximate cause of Stroot's injuries.13
The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Taco Bell on the
ground that no genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to Taco Bell's
actions being the proximate cause of Stroot's injuries. 4
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Parking Lots and Criminal Acts of Third Parties
Recently, plaintiffs around the country have sued business proprietors and
parking facilities for injuries they have suffered when attacked by third parties
in parking areas.'5 The common law rule was that a private property owner
generally had no duty to protect another from a criminal attack by a third
person. 6 A "special circumstances" exception to the common law rule imposes
a duty of care upon business owners to maintain their premises safely and to
exercise ordinary care to protect their business invitees from criminal attack.'
7
However, this "special circumstances" exception applies only where the attack
was foreseeable, and the patron's injuries occurred as a result of the proprietor's
act or omission. s
10. Id. at 448.
11. Id. Stroot contended that Taco Bell was aware of many previous occasions
where people had fought in the Taco Bell parking lot, and that the area in which this
particular franchise was located was known for criminal activity. Id.
12. Id. at 449.
13. Id. at 448.
14. Id.
15. See generally William M. Corrigan, Jr. & Timothy W. Van Ronzelen, Liability
for CriminalActs of Third Parties, 52 J. Mo. B. 359 (1996); James L. Isham, Annotation,
Parking Facility Proprietor's Liability for Criminal Attack on Patron, 49 A.L.R. 4th
1257 (1986).
16. Corrigan & Van Ronzelen, supra note 15, at 358; see also Madden v. C & K
Barbecue Carryout, Inc., 758 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Mo. 1988).
17. See Isham, supra note 15, § 2[a].
18. Id. A proprietor can also be found liable for the criminal acts of third parties
when the patron and proprietor have a special relationship, such as that of innkeeper-
[Vol. 65
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In a typical negligence cause of action against a business, a plaintiff bears
the burden of showing duty, breach, causation, and damages.1 9 The major
battlegrounds in the premises liability cases have centered primarily around
duty20 and, more recently, causation.2
1
Before a proprietor can be said to owe a duty to an invitee, there must be
some showing that the proprietor knew or had reason to know that there was a
potential danger to invitees.2 Courts around the country have disagreed about
the appropriate standard to apply in determining whether a proprietor knew or
had reason to know of a danger.' Some courts have applied the strict "prior
violent crimes" or "prior similar incidents" test, which requires that prior similar
crimes have occurred on the premises before a duty upon the business to take
steps to protect its patrons is triggered.24 Other jurisdictions have adopted the
"totality of circumstances" test, which allows a court to look at additional
factors, such as the crime rate in a particular area or whether the business had
taken any security measures, in determining the relative foreseeability of an
attack on its invitees.25
Missouri first recognized the "special circumstances" exception in Madden
v. C & K Barbecue Carryout, Inc.26 In Madden, a woman was abducted at
gunpoint, then physically and sexually assaulted.27 Madden contended that the
guest, common carrier-passenger, or employer-employee. However, Missouri courts
have consistently held that a general business invitee does not stand in any special
relationship with a proprietor and therefore a full discussion is beyond the scope of this
Note. See, e.g., Nappier v. Kincade, 666 S.W.2d 858, 861 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984);
Meadows v. Friedman R.R. Salvage Warehouse, 655 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983).
19. Madden, 758 S.W.2d at 61.
20. Id. at 62; see also Brown v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 973 S.W.2d 530, 532 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1998); Groce v. Kansas City Spirit, Inc., 925 S.W.2d 880, 884 (Mo. Ct. App.
1996); Bowman v. McDonald's Corp., 916 S.W.2d 270, 277 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995);
Keenan v. Miriam Found., 784 S.W.2d 298, 301 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
21. See generally Krause v. U.S. Truck Co., 787 S.W.2d 708, 710 (Mo. 1990);
Vann v. Town Topic, Inc., 780 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
22. Keenan v. Miriam Found., 784 S.W.2d 298, 302 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
23. See generally Corrigan & Van Ronzelen, supra note 15, at 359; Isham, supra
note 15, at 1257.
24. Henley v. Pizitz Realty Co., 456 So. 2d 272, 276 (Ala. 1984); Selektor v.
Smiles Parking Co., 618 N.Y.S.2d 813, 813 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
25. Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 658 (Cal. 1985); Stevens
v. Jefferson, 436 So. 2d 33, 35 (Fla. 1983); Siebert v. Vic Regnier Builders, Inc., 856
P.2d 1332, 1339 (Kan. 1993); Knor v. Parking Co. of America, 596 N.E.2d 1059, 1065
(Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Small v. McKennan Hosp., 403 N.W.2d 410, 413 (S.D. 1987).
26. 758 S.W.2d 59, 62 (Mo. 1988). Madden was consolidated with Decker v.
Gramex Corp., a case in which a husband and wife were abducted from a shopping
center parking lot and murdered.
27. Id. at 60.
2000] . 257
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defendant failed to provide adequate security and warn patrons of danger even
though the restaurant had been the scene of similar violent crimes in the three
years before she was attacked.28 The Missouri Supreme Court acknowledged
that the common law rule imposed no liability for the criminal acts of third
parties but stated:
[Missouri now] recognizes that business owners may be under a duty
to protect their invitees from the criminal attacks of unknown third
persons depending upon the facts and circumstances of a given case.
The touchstone for creation of a duty is foreseeability. A duty of care
arises out of the circumstances in which there is a foreseeable
likelihood that particular acts or omissions will cause harm or injury.29
Based on the foregoing rule, the court held that a plaintiff may establish and
maintain a cause of action by making a prima facie showing of facts that would
establish the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff.30
In Madden, the court did not explicitly adopt the "totality of circumstances"
test or the "prior similar incidents" test for foreseeability. Although one
Missouri case has interpreted Madden as espousing the "totality of
circumstances" test,3 every other Missouri case addressing the issue has held
that Madden requires the adoption of the "prior similar incidents" test.32 Thus,
it seems well settled that a plaintiff must establish the existence of prior crimes
on the premises that were sufficiently recent and similar to the events at issue so
as to have put the defendant on notice of the danger to its invitees.33
In Brown v. Schnuck Markets, Inc., 34 the plaintiff was injured during an
assault in a grocery store parking lot.35 She brought suit against Schnucks and
claimed that Schnucks breached its duty to make its premises reasonably safe. 6
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but the trial court entered judgment
28. Id.
29. Id. at 62.
30. Id. at 62-63.
31. Becker v. Diamond Parking, Inc., 768 S.W.2d 169, 170-71 (Mo. Ct. App.
1989).
32. See Brown v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 973 S.W.2d 530, 533 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998);
Groce v. Kansas City Spirit, Inc., 925 S.W.2d 880, 885 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Bowman
v. McDonald's Corp., 916 S.W.2d 270,277 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Miller v. South County
Ctr., Inc., 857 S.W.2d 507, 510-11 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Claybon v. Midwest Petroleum
Co., 819 S.W.2d 742,746 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Keenan v. Miriam Found., 784 S.W.2d
298, 302 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
33. See Keenan, 784 S.W.2d at 303.
34. 973 S.W.2d 530 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)
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notwithstanding the verdict 7 because it felt that the plaintiff produced
insufficient evidence of facts creating a duty of care attributable to the grocery
store.3" On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of
Missouri applied the "special circumstances" test for imposing liability on a
business for the criminal acts of a third party.39 According to the court, in order
to establish a defendant's duty of care, a plaintiff must show:
(1) [T]he necessary relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant; (2) the prior specific incidents of violent crimes on the
premises that are sufficiently numerous and recent to put a defendant
on notice, either actual or constructive, that there is a likelihood that
third persons will endanger the safety of the defendant's invitees; and
(3) the incident causing the injury is sufficiently similar in type to the
prior specific incidents occurring on the premises that a reasonable
person would take precautions against that type of activity.40
The court upheld the trial court's decision, focusing primarily on the fact that
only two prior crimes were shown to have occurred on the lot and that those
crimes (a purse snatching and ajuvenile robbery) were not similar enough to the
attack on the plaintiff to establish a duty on Schnucks to take reasonable steps
to protect its patrons.4'
Proximate cause has also become an important issue in recent premises
liability cases.42 Obviously, the biggest hurdle for most plaintiffs is connecting
the defendant's actions or lack thereof with the injuries sustained by the
plaintiff.43 A popular theory for defendants has been that some act taken by the
plaintiff, such as leaving a restaurant,4 represents an intervening cause that
cancels the duty owed to the plaintiff.45 In Vann v. Town Topic, Inc., 46 a
restaurant patron was injured in the street during an altercation with some people
who had been ejected from the restaurant.47 The Missouri Court of Appeals for
the Western District of Missouri held that the attack on the plaintiff was




40. Id. (citing Keenan v. Miriam Found., 784 S.W.2d 298, 303 (Mo. Ct. App.
1990)).
41. Id. at 534.
42. See Vann v. Town Topic, Inc., 780 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 661-62.
45. Id. at 662.
46. 780 S.W.2d 659 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
47. Id. at 661.
2000]
5
Reuschel: Reuschel: Here's Your Burrito and Watch Your Back:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
MISSOURILA WREVIEW
because the plaintiff voluntarily interjected himself into a fracas. 48 The court
also noted that while comparative fault principles are generally applicable in
premises liability cases,49 there can be no apportionment of fault when there has
been a finding of no proximate cause between the plaintiff's injuries and the
defendant's supposed negligen.cei 0 Vann illustrates the need for a plaintiff to
establish that the defendant's negligence caused the plaintiff s harm or else face
the prospect of having his case dismissed at the summary judgment stage.
B. The Rescue Doctrine and Its Role in Premises Liability Cases
The rescue doctrine developed in this country as a way to promote rescue
attempts by removing traditional proximate cause barriers to recovery.5' In the
famous words of Judge Cardozo, "[d]anger invites rescue. 52 The rescue
doctrine provides one injured during the course of a rescue with recourse against
the original tortfeasor on the grounds that rescue attempts are deemed
foreseeable for purposes of proximate cause analysis. 3
In 1884, Missouri first recognized the rescue doctrine in Donahoe v. The
Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Co.54 As the doctrine developed in
Missouri, courts held that a rescuer may recover from the original tortfeasor as
long as the rescue attempt was not rash or reckless. 5 In Lowrey v. Horvath,56 the
Missouri Supreme Court considered a case in which a rescuer was asphyxiated
while trying to rescue a person who had become trapped while attempting to
clean a well.57 The court affirmed the general premise of the rescue doctrine and
found that: (1) it is not negligent to knowingly and voluntarily place oneself in
a position where the likelihood of injury is great when carrying out a rescue,58
and (2) the negligence of the defendant that imperiled the rescuee is deemed to
be the proximate cause of the rescuer's injuries.59
The traditional barrier to rescue cases in Missouri was the harsh
contributory negligence principle that barred recovery for rescue attempts
48. Id. at 662.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Gray v. Russell, 853 S.W.2d 928, 931 (Mo. 1993).
52. Wagner v. International Ry. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 180 (1921).
53. Krause v. U.S. Truck Co., 787 S.W.2d 708, 710-11 (Mo. 1990).
54. 83 Mo. 560, 563 (1884).
55. See, e.g., Lowrey v. Horvath, 689 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Mo. 1985); Welch v.
Hesston Corp., 540 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
56. 689 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. 1985).
57. Id. at 626.
58. Id. at 627; see also McConnell v. Pic-Walsh Freight Co., 432 S.W.2d 292, 300
(Mo. 1968).
59. Lowrey, 689 S.W.2d at 627.
[Vol. 65
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considered to be rash or reckless.' However, in 1983, in Gustafson v. Benda,
Missouri abrogated contributory negligence and replaced it with comparative
fault.6 1 To date, the only reported Missouri case to address the effect of
comparative fault on the rescue doctrine is Allison v. Sverdrup & Parcel &
Associates, Inc.
62
In Allison, a rescuer died as a result of inhaling noxious fumes while
attempting to aid a man trapped in a grain bin.63 The court examined the history
of comparative fault and concluded that the principles of comparative fault are
applicable to rescue cases in which the rescuer's conduct is rash or reckless. 4
Consequently, if the rescuer's conduct is deemed rash or reckless, a court should
determine the plaintiff s degree of fault and reduce her damages accordingly.
As long as the rescue attempt was not reckless or rash, comparative fault analysis
does not come into play because the rescue doctrine clearly states that a rescue
attempt is not considered per se negligent.6
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In Stroot, the court began by setting forth the elements necessary to make
a submissible claim for negligence. 67 Since the trial court based its grant of
summary judgment for Taco Bell on its finding that no proximate cause existed,
the reviewing court looked only at the issue of whether Stroot had made a prima
facie showing of causation so as to allow Stroot to take his case to a jury.
Before discussing the general rules of proximate and intervening causes, the
60. See Allison v. Sverdrup & Parcel & Assocs., Inc., 738 S.W.2d 440, 450 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1987); Welch, 540 S.W.2d at 129.
61. 661 S.W.2d 11, 16 (Mo. 1983). Missouri's comparative fault scheme has been
characterized as "pure" in that a plaintiff can recover (subject to reduction by her own
percentage of fault) even if her fault exceeds 50%. See Lippard v. Houdaille Indus., Inc.,
715 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Mo. 1986).
62. 738 S.W.2d 440, 451 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
63. Id. at 447-48.
64. Id. at 451.
65. Id.
66. Id. A vast majority of other jurisdictions that have adopted comparative fault
follow Missouri in holding that comparative fault is not triggered if a rescue was not rash
or reckless. If the rescue attempt was rash or reckless, then comparative fault applies,
and the plaintiffs recovery is reduced in proportion to his percentage of fault. See
Sweetman v. State Highway Dept., 357 N.W.2d 783, 789 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984);
Pachesky v. Getz, 510 A.2d 776, 783 (Pa. 1986); Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Rescue
Doctrine: Applicability and Application of Comparative Negligence Principles, 75
A.L.R. 4th 875 (1990).
67. Stroot v. Taco Bell Corp., 972 S.W.2d 447, 448 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
68. Id. at 448-49.
2000]
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court noted that although proximate cause is normally an issue for the jury,69 a
trial court can take the issue when the evidence reveals a potential intervening
cause of damage.70 The court also found that the test for proximate cause is
whether the negligence of the defendant caused the plaintiff's injury or whether
the plaintiff s injury was a natural and probable consequence of the defendant's
actions.7'
The court relied heavily on Vann7' and found that Stroot's injuries, like
Vann's, were the result of Stroot's voluntary interjection into a situation. 3 The
court also found that Stroot's voluntary interjection was an intervening cause,
negating the effect of the defendant's conduct. 74 The court noted that Stroot's
intervention was independent of any negligence on the part of Taco Bell,75 and
that Stroot would not have been injured if he had stayed inside the restaurant. 76
The court next concluded with the observation that Stroot was not entitled to
have ajury assess his comparative negligence since he did not make the required
showing of the elements of negligence.77 More specifically, the court found that
Stroot failed to make a prima facie showing of causation because of his
intervention in the fight.78
V. COMMENT
A. Should Liability Be Imposed for the Criminal Acts of Others?
The first question that needs to be addressed is whether a duty should be
placed on business owners to protect their patrons from the criminal acts of third
parties. Both plaintiffs and defendants have found fault with the Madden rule's
imposition of a duty of reasonable care upon a business when a plaintiff can
establish that "prior similar incidents" have occurred on the premises.
Plaintiffs dislike the "prior similar incidents" test for foreseeability because
until a similar crime has occurred, the defendant business is insulated from any
liability, even if it knows that it may be located in a dangerous neighborhood.
The situation is somewhat analogous to animal liability cases, in which a dog
69. Id. at 449.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Vann v. Town Topic, Inc., 780 S.W.2d 659 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
73. Stroot v. Taco Bell Corp., 972 S.W.2d 447, 449 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
74. Id.
75. Id. This conclusion by the appellate panel completely ignored the question of
whether Stroot's intervention was precipitated by Taco Bell's negligence in failing to
make the premises reasonably safe for its patrons.
76. Id.
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gets "one free bite" before its owner becomes liable for injuries caused by the
dog.79 It seems patently unfair that a business owner who knows that his
premises are dangerous, and does nothing to increase security for his patrons (or
at least warn them), has a get out of jail free card good as long as no similar
crimes have occurred on the premises.
Another problem encountered by plaintiffs is that even if there have been
prior crimes on the premises, the "prior similar incidents" test requires that the
prior crimes be reasonably similar to the present crime. 80 But what if the prior
crimes were purse snatches and the present crime is assault and battery? Under
Missouri's approach, the prior purse snatches would be irrelevant for purposes
of imputing a duty to the defendant to protect the safety of its patrons because
the characteristics of the two incidents are not substantially similar."'
This logic seems flawed because the real issue is the foreseeability of the
crime given what the defendant knows about the relative danger of his parking
lot. One could surmise that even purse snatches would be sufficient to put a
defendant on notice that some additional security measures could or should be
taken. Just because the severity of a particular crime is somewhat different than
that encountered in the past, a business owner should not be absolved of liability
when he knows that crimes have occurred on his property. Adoption of the
"totality of circumstances" test would alleviate the problems of "one free bite"
and make business owners pay attention to conditions on and around their
premises so that steps could be taken to reasonably protect people from danger.
Defendants and business groups also have doubts about the vitality of
Missouri's approach to liability for the criminal acts of others.8 2 Some are
concerned that the burden of crime-fighting is being improperly shifted from
publicly funded police forces to private businesses, and that this change will
eventually mean higher prices for consumers.83 Others have stated that placing
an additional financial burden upon business owners represents a significant
public policy choice outside the province of the judicial branch and better
handled by the legislature." Another argument against the imposition of liability
on business is that a customer assumes the risk of attack by going into a
neighborhood that the customer knows may be dangerous. This argument is
somewhat tenuous for several reasons. The doctrine of assumption of risk is
based upon the premise that an actor knowingly and voluntarily accepts a known
risk and has made a conscious choice. But do some patrons, particularly in the
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 509 (1965).
80. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
81. Keesee v. Freeman, 772 S.W.2d 663, 669 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
82. For an excellent discussion of policy rationales against the Missouri rule
imposing liability for foreseeable acts of third parties, see Madden v. C & K Barbecue
Carryout, Inc., 758 S.W.2d 59, 66-67 (Mo. 1988) (Welliver, J. & Donnelly, J.,
dissenting).
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inner city, have any real choice about where they do business? Many people are
severely limited by economic and other factors that mandate that they do their
business in some of the less prosperous and more dangerous neighborhoods in
town. If a choice really exists, it seems to come down to a choice between
possibly being robbed at the store or not eating. It is also important to remember
that all of the business's patrons are invited onto the premises, and that a
significant number of these patrons may have been enticed by the business's
advertising to ignore possible dangers."
Furthermore, it seems fairer to place the burden on the business under
assumption of risk principles. The business owner (unlike many inner city
residents) does have a real choice. The business owner can conduct business in
high crime areas, or he can choose to invest his money elsewhere. The business
owner who chooses to invite customers into high crime areas should be made to
take reasonable steps to keep his patrons safe. Since the business owner gets the
benefit of having the opportunity to make profits, he should also bear the cost of
security for making the choice to engage in business where customers may be
endangered.
Some have speculated that requiring businesses to take precautions and
threatening liability for criminal attack will result in fewer business ventures in
high risk areas so that the losers will be the inner city residents left without a
place to shop. This does not seem to be a serious concern since the precautions
necessary to prevent the imposition of liability, such as adequate lighting or the
hiring of a security guard, are fairly nominal. No one is asking that business
owners become insurers against every possible criminal contingency, but they
should be forced to take simple steps to make their premises reasonably safe.
Even though adding lighting or one extra employee costs relatively little,
businesses can always pass these extra costs to their customers through the form
of slightly higher prices. Even with higher prices for added security, many
customers will still find that shopping near home is less expensive and less
burdensome than going to a safer neighborhood. Furthermore, even if some
businesses pull out of a given area, there seems to be no shortage of
entrepreneurs willing to go into inner city areas (even with the higher overhead
costs brought on by extra security) and open up shop where there is an obvious
demand for services.
B. Was Stroot Entitled to Reach a Jury?
In order to survive a motion for summary judgment on a negligence claim,
a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing on the elements of negligence:
85. This point was articulated in Judge Robertson's concurring opinion in Madden,
758 S.W.2d at 65.
86. Madden, 758 S.W.2d at 65.
[Vol. 65
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duty, breach, causation, and damages.87 In Stroot, the court did not reach the
question of whether Stroot established that Taco Bell had a duty to protect him.88
Instead, the court focused on the fact that Stroot's involvement in the altercation
was an intervening cause that canceled any duty that Taco Bell may have owed
him.8
9
The problem with the decision in Stroot is that it fails to recognize and
incorporate the rescue doctrine into the body of Missouri law dealing with
liability for attacks in parking lots by third parties. Stroot's appeal failed because
Stroot was unable to show that Taco Bell's negligence caused his injuries.90
However, Stroot went to the parking lot in an attempt to assist a woman he
reasonably believed was in need of assistance. 9' The proper analysis of these
facts should have started with an inquiry into whether Taco Bell owed a duty of
care (based on the previous incidents) to take reasonable steps to protect from,
or warn its patrons about, the possibility of criminal attack. If Taco Bell owed
a duty to the female patron that Stroot went to assist, Stroot's actions could not
be deemed negligent (under the rescue doctrine) so long as they were not rash
or reckless.92 One can assume that Taco Bell owed a duty to protect or warn the
female patron as well as all of its customers based on the facts alleged in the
petition and its supporting affidavits. 3 In any event, under the rescue doctrine,
a prima facie case of duty would clearly have been shown for purposes of
surviving a summary judgment motion. 4
As previously discussed, the rescue doctrine serves as a method whereby
a plaintiff may escape the causation problems attendant to any rescue situation.95
In this case, Taco Bell's failure to provide adequate security after receiving
notice of prior similar incidents should have been deemed the proximate cause
of Stroot's injuries. Even if Stroot's intervention was considered rash and
reckless, Missouri's comparative fault scheme should have applied, and the jury
87. Krause v. United States Truck Co., 787 S.W.2d 708, 710 (Mo. 1990).
88. Stroot v. Taco Bell Corp., 972 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
Although the court did not discuss whether a duty existed, Stroot produced affidavits
from Taco Bell employees indicating that there had been a long history of fights and
other violent activities in the parking lot similar to the one that resulted in Stroot's
injuries. Id. at 448. One could probably conclude that by pleading the previous
incidents, as well as producing supporting affidavits, Stroot met his burden of production
as to the duty of Taco Bell (based upon the framework laid out in Madden) so as to
survive Taco Bell's motion for summary judgment.
89. Id. at 449.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 448.
92. Lowrey v. Horvath, 689 S.W.2d 625, 627 (Mo. 1985).
93. See supra note 88.
94. See supra note 88.
95. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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should have been able to apportion the percentage of fault it deemed proper.16
Stroot properly pled his cause of action and Taco Bell's motion for summary
judgment should have been denied at the trial level or at least reversed by the
appellate court. Perhaps unintended, this case could have the effect of chilling
rescue attempts because an original tortfeasor's negligence will not be
considered if the rescue attempt is classified as an "intervening cause."
VI. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs face many hurdles in bringing an action for damages against a
defendant when the actual injury was inflicted by a third person. Traditionally,
plaintiffs have had difficulty proving causation, and cases such as Stroot
illustrate the need for plaintiffs to find some independent causation doctrine (like
rescue) in order to reach a jury.
Since before our country was founded, courts have had a difficult time
determining when one person should be found to have a duty to protect others
from third party criminal acts. Modem courts seem to be moving away from the
rigid common law approach that barred liability completely and have slowly
been replacing it with a standard based on foreseeability. The main battleground
seems to be shaping up around how one defines foreseeability. For the time
being, Missouri courts have interpreted Madden to require that prior criminal
acts be substantially similar to the acts complained of by the plaintiff. The
merits of this standard can be debated, but it seems that foreseeability of criminal
activity in a location should not be strictly limited to the exact types of crimes
that have previously occurred. It remains to be seen whether the "totality of
circumstances" test for the imposition of a duty on a commercial defendant will
ultimately prevail.
Most troubling about the Stroot decision is that it suggests that Missouri
courts are moving away from the well settled principles of the rescue doctrine.
If a court is willing to characterize a man's attempt to assist a woman in distress
as an independent "intervening cause," without consideration of the underlying
negligence of the business that necessitated the rescue, one must wonder if the
rescue doctrine is in need of rescue.
TIMOTHY A. REUSCHEL
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